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Abstract 
Collective political action among divergent interest groups is not always easy. It requires 
coordination, compromise and, often, the persuasive action of a policy entrepreneur. Coalition 
strategies are often shaped by participants’ skill in mobilising ideas. Business-environmental 
coalitions – often considered ‘strange bedfellows’ – have proved to be important in emissions 
trading policy-making. In 2013, chronically low emissions prices meant that the EU’s climate 
policy flagship, the EU-ETS, was holed beneath the waterline. But, within two years and against 
the odds, ambitious reforms were agreed to steady the ship. Crucial to the rescue were the 
actions of a pro-ETS business lobby, orchestrated by environmentalists. We draw on thirty-two 
in-depth interviews to construct a discursive institutionalist account of collective interest 
representation in relation to the reforms. We highlight the ability of policy entrepreneurs to 
fashion a ‘change-but-no-change’ pro-reform narrative attractive to businesses, despite the fact 
that such discursive strategies risked marginalising alternative and more disruptive ideas.  
Keywords: Climate policy; Emissions trading; Energy policy; Interest representation; Policy 
entrepreneurship; Strange bedfellow coalitions 
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1 Introduction  
Since its introduction in 2005, Europe’s primary climate change mitigation instrument, the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), has undergone successive reform 
(Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010). One dramatic and politically fraught episode followed a 
collapse in the price of allowances in 2012-2013 that necessitated the ‘rescue’ of the instrument 
through substantial restructuring. Support in the form of ‘backloading’ was agreed in 2013, and 
in 2015, a ‘market stability reserve’ (MSR) was introduced: measures subsequently argued to 
have stabilised the instrument (Wettestad 2014; Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016). The success of 
the EU-ETS ‘rescue mission’ depended on timing, compromises at national and EU levels, and, 
importantly for this paper, interest group activity (Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016: 106). While 
the relative importance of interest groups in securing the reforms is debatable, that it was 
politically possible at all, can be partly attributed to the support of key business actors (Jevnaker 
and Wettestad 2017: 119). As we argue below, this support resulted from deliberate and 
concerted coalition-building efforts among interest groups, involving close collaboration 
between businesses and environmental groups, traditionally considered ‘strange bedfellows’.  
Networking has long been considered fundamental to interest representation and has been 
subjected to academic enquiry for decades (Heclo 1978; Richardson 1994; Mahoney 2007). 
Such activity can range from informal networks to highly formalised arrangements such as 
trade associations (ibid.). Somewhere between these two extremes lies ad-hoc, issue-specific 
coalitions (Mahoney 2007). Crucially, the emergence (or otherwise) of any lobbying coalition 
is a complex matter and may depend on multiple factors such as the policy problem and the 
resources available to interest groups (Holyoke 2009). Typically, such coalitions comprise 
members whose interests are manifestly aligned, for example, businesses located in the same 
industrial sector or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a common concern for policy 
areas such as the environment. Some coalitions, however, can be heterogeneous combining 
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business and non-business organisations (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Beyers and De Bruycker 
2017): so-called ‘strange-bedfellow’ coalitions. Arguably, those coalitions that include a 
diversity of interests can signal broader support for a policy position, and therefore potentially 
wield greater influence (Beyers and De Bruycker 2017; Phinney 2017). However, forming 
these coalitions requires agreement on goals and the means for goal attainment. The significant 
challenges posed by such arrangements could explain why such ‘strange bedfellow’ coalitions 
are less common than more homogenous groupings (Beyers and De Bruycker 2017).  
Recent climate governance research shows that coalition-building often features in 
‘entrepreneurial’ strategies by which skilled actors pursue ‘power through organisation’ 
(Boasson and Huitema 2017; Meckling 2011b: 29). Understood strategically, active coalition-
building emphasises the importance of coordinating actors or policy entrepreneurs who 
exercise agency by “…diffusing information, ensuring collaboration and motivating others” to 
join collective political enterprises (Boasson and Huitema 2017: 1348). When creating 
coalitions, policy entrepreneurs must align and re-order the preferences of a wider group 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012). This is no small feat: to engender cooperation, policy 
entrepreneurs must simultaneously convince others that they are not narrowly self-interested, 
sense how others conceptualise their interests, the institutional environment, and their role 
within it and, ultimately, articulate a group identity to which a suitably broad range of actors 
can subscribe (Ansell 1997; Fligstein 2001). From this perspective, the establishment, 
maintenance and mobilisation of diverse lobbying coalitions is a discursive exercise in which 
policy entrepreneurs often play a crucial role (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 50).  
In this paper we explore the development of ‘strange bedfellow’ coalitions within the EU-ETS 
‘rescue mission’ using a discursive institutionalist (DI) approach (Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 
2010) to address one central question: What does DI reveal about the agency of policy 
entrepreneurs who sought to reform the EU-ETS between 2012 and 2015? The research 
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employed a process-tracing method, combining extensive documentary analysis, observation 
of policy debates, and thirty-two semi-structured interviews1 conducted between 2015 and 
2016. Interviewees included EU institution staff, NGOs, and businesses actively involved in 
EU climate and energy policy at that time. Of particular interest is the discursive actions of 
policy entrepreneurs in fashioning a highly influential ‘strange bedfellow’ coalition of 
businesses and environmental groups and the role they played in EU-ETS reform. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 elaborates our analytical framework, 
discursive institutionalism. Section 3 applies it to our selected case. Section 4 discusses and 
reflects on the findings and provides conclusions. 
2 Conceptual framework: discursive institutionalism and the role of policy 
entrepreneurs 
In using discursive institutionalism (DI) (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Schmidt 2002; 
Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2014; Schmidt 2017; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004), this 
article responds to an upsurge of recent research employing DI as an organising framework for 
public policy analysis (see for example: Buijs et al. 2014; Crespy and Schmidt 2014; den 
Besten et al. 2014; Fairbrass 2011; Lauber and Schenner 2011; Lorenzoni and Benson 2014; 
Schmidt 2014). In so doing, we seek to build on past scholarship by offering a more developed 
conception of the discursive nature of policy entrepreneurship. 
It should be noted at this point that DI is the most recent manifestation of a wave of ‘new 
institutionalist’ thinking that includes Historical Institutionalism (HI), Rational Institutionalism 
(RI), and Sociological Institutionalism (SI).  In Schmidt’s words (2010), DI differs from the 
other three new institutionalisms in terms of its objects of explanation, its logic of explanation, 
its problems of explanation and its approach to questions of continuity and change.  In common 
with Schmidt (2008), we consider DI to be complementary to these theoretical approaches but 
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also see it as a ‘useful corrective’ to them, given their inability to account for institutional 
change. A lack of space here precludes further detailed discussion of DI in comparison to other 
new institutionalisms but see Fairbrass (2011, pages 954-956) for a comparison between DI, 
HI, SI and RI and a summary of their relative merits and deficiencies. In short, arguably, the 
most significant difference between DI and earlier versions of new institutionalism is its focus 
on discursive interaction and the role of ideas in bringing about or preventing policy change. 
DI’s particular novelty lies in perceiving ideas and discourse as dynamic and by emphasising 
the ‘meaning’ context of ideas themselves (Schmidt, 2010).  
2.1 Institutions, ideas, and discursive interaction 
Among DI’s main contributions, as distinct from other ‘new institutional’ approaches, is its 
treatment of institutions as both ‘given’ (i.e. by providing the context in which actors think, 
speak and act) and ‘contingent’ (i.e. the result of actors thinking, speaking and acting). 
Institutions are therefore both simultaneously external ‘constraining structures’ and internal 
‘enabling constructs of meaning’. Consequently, actors’ agency is exercised through both their 
‘background ideational abilities’, which allow action within the constraints of a particular 
institutional context, and their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ that enable them to think 
outside the institutional context in which they are acting and to communicate critically to 
change or maintain those institutions (Schmidt 2008: 314; Schmidt 2017).  
In DI, ideas may occur at several levels of generality: firstly, as policy ideas which are the most 
specific and detailed; secondly as programmatic ideas that underpin policy ideas and set out 
the problems to be solved by policies; and finally, as deeper philosophical ideas can be 
considered even more elemental than the other two levels and can be seen as ‘deep core’ ideas 
that are rarely contested apart from times of crisis (Schmidt 2008, 306). The last category 
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represents the organising beliefs, mind-sets, tenets, and principles of knowledge and 
understanding on which society relies.  
DI also distinguishes between ‘cognitive’ ideas (i.e. that tell us ‘what is or what to do’) and 
‘normative’ ideas (i.e. that set out ‘what one ought to do’) (Schmidt 2008: 306). Cognitive 
ideas can provide the methods or procedures for political action. At the programmatic level, 
cognitive ideas may define the problems to be solved and indicate potential solutions. 
Cognitive ideas may also demonstrate how policy and programmatic level ideas can be 
interwoven with fundamentally deep core ideas. By contrast, normative ideas provide the 
values that connect to political action and serve to validate policies. They can also furnish the 
principles and beliefs that can link all three levels of ideas.  
Finally, ‘discourse’ is the process by which actors interact and ideas are generated, deliberated 
and legitimated (Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2010). These interactive processes may take two 
forms: ‘coordinative’ discourse among direct participants in the policy process, or 
‘communicative’ discourse that links the policy process to a more general public (Schmidt 
2008: 310–311). Participants in coordinative discourse are usually political élites: elected 
officials, civil servants and administrators, interest groups and think tanks (Schmidt 2002). 
Communicative discourse potentially encompasses a wider range of political actors (such as 
political leaders, policy forums, and informed publics) who bring ideas developed through 
coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation. The relative importance 
of coordinative and communicative discourse is determined by complexities of the political 
system. For example, in ‘compound polities’ such as the EU, coordinative discourse is more 
important (Schmidt 2010; Schmidt 2013). Accordingly, in our research it is the coordinative 
communication surrounding the EU-ETS that provides our focal point. 
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2.1 Policy entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship 
Although the DI literature does imply a role for policy entrepreneurs who:  
“…serve as catalysts for change as they draw on and articulate the ideas of discursive 
communities and coalitions” (Schmidt 2008: 310),  
this aspect of the framework remains under-specified. Given our particular focus on 
coordinative, interactive processes associated with the EU-ETS reform and the policy 
entrepreneurs who participated in it, we propose a more developed conceptualisation of their 
roles and activities. We contend that greater clarity and depth of understanding about the role 
entrepreneurs play in the coordinative interactive processes associated with policy-making 
strengthens DI as an analytical framework.  
Policy entrepreneurs are potent political actors who invest time and effort into identifying, 
analysing, and advancing particular policy problems on the policy agenda and offering policy 
solutions (Béland and Katapally 2018). They are often identified by their ability to achieve 
greater results than their material resources may suggest, i.e. doing ‘more with less’ or 
‘punch[ing] above their weight’ (Boasson and Huitema 2017: 1344). Entrepreneurs may play  
different formal or informal roles in the policy process: as elected officials, staff or members 
of political parties, interest groups, and think tanks. Entrepreneurial strategies can be 
categorised as ‘structural’ attempts to reorder the distribution of authority and information, or 
‘cultural-institutional’ attempts to manipulate ideas and their perception through discursive 
actions such as ‘framing’ (Boasson and Huitema 2017). Successful policy entrepreneurship 
requires the framing of a problem, having a solution prepared and a keen sense of timing 
(Cairney 2018; Fitch-Roy and Fairbrass 2018). 
A role clearly exists for policy entrepreneurship in creating lobbying coalitions. Within specific 
institutional contexts, they are skilled actors that use their discursive abilities to bring about 
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cooperation within and between disparate groups, build and maintain institutions and reshape 
the social order through creating new forms of meaning attractive to others (Fligstein 2001: 
106). This may necessitate developing narratives or stories that appeal to others’:  
“…identity, belief, and interests, while at the same time using those same stories to frame 
action against various opponents” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 50).  
However, defining entrepreneurship purely through the personal attributes of a hypothesised 
policy entrepreneur may overstate the agency of individuals and underplays the vital 
importance of social context (Boasson and Huitema 2017). As Schmidt (2008: 320) points out, 
the agency afforded to élite entrepreneurial actors to shape the communicative discourse 
extends only as far as it can be sustained through bottom-up communicative legitimation. 
Nevertheless, we maintain that discursive entrepreneurship evidently plays an important role 
within the rarefied world of lobbying and advocacy. Typically, policy entrepreneurship 
requires particular skills and capabilities such as (Mintrom and Luetjens 2017; Mintrom and 
Norman 2009; Mintrom and Thomas 2018): 
 social acuity or the ability to understand others’ perspectives;  
 credibility gained either through a particular claim to knowledge or experience or the 
ability to surround oneself with credible supporters; 
 the ability to gain others’ trust and build cohesive social units; 
 tenacity, dogged determination to work towards long-term goals, in spite of setbacks. 
In analysing the data collected for this paper, we pay particular attention to the role of 
entrepreneurs in engineering the EU-ETS reforms between 2012 and 2015.  
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3 Applying DI to the EU-ETS rescue mission 
3.1 The EU-ETS and institutional context  
Implemented in 2005, the EU-ETS was the world’s first and most comprehensive international 
greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade system and covers around half of EU emissions 
(European Commission 2016). The mere existence of a functioning EU-ETS is regarded as a 
major policy success for the European Union (Convery 2009; Oberthür 2011). Institutional 
embeddedness and the political capital sunk in its creation mean that the EU-ETS plays a 
central role in EU energy and climate policymaking (Bailey et al. 2011; Woerdman 2004). 
While the system continues to evolve, the immutable status of the principle of ‘cap and trade’ 
is often expressed by describing the EU-ETS as Europe’s ‘flagship’ or ‘cornerstone’ climate 
policy (Braun 2009; Convery 2009; Groenenberg et al. 2008; Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010; 
Wettestad 2014). Within the European Commission, while DG Energy tended to support using 
multiple instruments in pursuit of climate policy goals, by 2015 the focus on emissions trading 
as the primary EU climate policy led to DG Clima being nicknamed “DG ETS” (Interview 2, 
2015; Interview 11, 2015). The incoming Energy Commissioner Oettinger was perceived as 
closer to the business community and more industry-orientated that his predecessor (Buchan 
and Keay 2014; Bürgin 2015) to such an extent that some environmentalists referred to him as 
“Commissioner for the energy intensive industries”, reflecting the “direct line” alleged to exist 
between him and heavy industry (Interview 8, 2015; Interview 30, 2016).  
A decade after its conception, the performance of the EU-ETS had become troubling 
(Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016). During 2012 and 2013, oversupply of allowances led to prices 
falling below €10 per tonne, a level deemed too low to meaningfully impact energy sector 
investment decisions (European Commission 2014b; EWEA 2014; IETA 2012). Widespread 
concern arose about the instrument’s ability to drive change (Interview 7, 2015; Interview 25, 
2015; Hone 2017: 105). Following a heated debate among policy actors, the European 
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Commission’s proposed a reform package, first proposing ‘backloading’2 or temporarily 
withholding allowances scheduled for market auction in 2012, with proposals for substantial, 
structural reform sketched out (European Commission 2012). In early 2013, however, the 
European Parliament narrowly rejected the relatively modest (and temporary) backloading 
proposals, leading commentators to speculate about the demise of the ETS (The Economist 
2013). However, in an unexpected turnaround in mid-2013, the Parliament voted to accept a 
slightly amended backloading proposal3, with the final agreement between the Council and 
Parliament resulting in a Commission Regulation in February 2014 (European Commission 
2014a). In parallel, the Commission developed proposals for permanent, structural ETS reform, 
seen as significant as renewed ambition emerged for climate and energy policy action after 
2020. By January 2014, following substantial consultation and negotiation, plans were 
published for a ‘Market Stability Reserve’ (MSR) that allowed the number of marketable 
permits to vary according to the allowances in circulation (European Commission 2014c). A 
Commission MSR proposal was adopted in 2015 which is scheduled for operation in 2019 
(European Commission 2014c; European Parliament 2014; Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016). 
Emerging from the same process, a revised EU-ETS Directive was proposed by the 
Commission, coming into force in April 2018 (European Union 2018). 
That the EU-ETS was resuscitated first through backloading, and then MSR in just two years, 
and rehabilitated through revised legislation less than three years later, with little change in 
external conditions, required significant political negotiation and persuasion. Events in member 
states, the European Parliament and within the Commission all contributed to the reversal of 
fortunes (see Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016). While existing reports of the EU-ETS reform 
process ascribe a role to businesses and interest groups, it is generally seen in terms of disunity 
in opposition to reform, with the energy intensive industries’ failure to build meaningful 
support for their position enabling the reforms to proceed (Jevnaker and Wettestad 2017: 117). 
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However, we suggest that the divide between ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ businesses was reinforced by 
significant coordination of rescue efforts among pro-ETS businesses. On the surface, such 
coordination seems unsurprising, but the fact that the grouping from which it emerged included 
a wide range of businesses, and that much of the organising effort was undertaken by an 
environmental group, raises the question of how and why this happened. In the following 
sections, we examine this ‘strange bedfellow’ coalition.  
3.2 Competing set of ideas 
Here we outline the primary ideas that constituted the discourse among EU energy and climate 
interest groups between 2012 and 2015, as identified by interviewees. The first  idea is ‘climate 
action’, a set of largely normative assumptions about the rationale for and, urgency and nature 
of, climate policy. The second is ‘technology neutrality’, an ostensibly cognitive assessment of 
the role of public policy in ‘picking winners’ either by specifying technology choices or by 
allowing markets to determine technology outcomes. 
3.2.1 Climate action  
Scientific consensus concludes that the earth’s climate is changing and that human activity, 
principally carbon dioxide emissions largely associated with energy supply, is responsible 
(IPCC 2014; The Royal Society 2017). Despite some noisy interventions from so-called 
‘climate-denialists’, the acceptance of the scale and urgency of the problem is well established, 
especially among the European élites engaged in EU policymaking. Nevertheless, ideas about 
whether and how to engage in ‘climate action’ to mitigate the risks associated with a changing 
climate are not monolithic, neither across society, nor within particular social settings such 
policy communities (Fitch-Roy et al. 2018). Contrasting material and cultural factors create 
differing interpretations of the reality of climate change, as well as the causal factors linking 
policy action and outcomes (Dietz et al. 2007).  
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The issue of EU-ETS reform reflects years of entrenched division between Europe’s heavy 
industries such as steel, aluminium, and cement on one side and other less carbon-intensive 
manufacturing and service industries, civil society groups, ‘new’ energy industries and the 
electricity industries on the other (Fitch-Roy and Fairbrass 2018). The two sides have starkly 
divergent material interests. The electricity industry, for example, may pass the costs of carbon 
trading onto consumers for whom demand is especially price-inelastic while the steel industry 
is globally mobile and competes with manufacturers not covered by the EU-ETS (Juergens et 
al. 2013). The energy intensive industries have fought, with some success, to be treated as a 
special case within the EU-ETS, largely by raising concerns about ‘carbon leakage’, a 
postulated race-to-the-bottom process by which industry leaves the EU seeking lower 
regulatory costs (Wettestad 2009).  
This material exceptionalism of the energy intensive industries, combined with differences in 
approach to the social interaction required to discuss policy, creates a situation where the 
preferred types of policies are disputed among actors alongside no common understanding of 
the basic diagnosis. Indeed, the perceived motives of the ‘others’ generates mutual suspicion. 
Energy intensive industry lobbyists may perceive that while they argue to keep industry and 
jobs in Europe, the ‘opposition’ are either cynically or ideologically determined to push those 
industries away. Concurrently, energy intensive industries are considered ‘dinosaurs’ which 
either do not comprehend the seriousness of the climate challenge or have callous disregard for 
its implications. While neither of these caricatures is objectively correct, the topic of EU-ETS 
reform reveals the deep gulf between the energy intensive industries, resistant to EU-ETS 
reform, and other European businesses and NGOs. 
3.2.2 Technology neutrality  
Meanwhile, business and civil-society actors that do accept their role is tackling climate change 
are divided by attitudes to ‘technology neutrality’. The idea that it is better to create a price for 
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carbon, to ‘internalise’ its societal costs and allow markets to respond with appropriate 
mitigations has long been discussed in climate change and sustainable energy debates (Azar 
and Sandén 2011). However, technology-neutrality and its role in sustainable energy policy 
has consistently divided opinion (Azar and Sandén 2011; Jacobsson et al. 2009). Throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s, for example, debate raged about whether effective renewable energy 
support policies were technology-neutral and whether the market should ‘select’ which 
technologies should be brought forward or whether a more targeted strategy should be adopted 
in which chosen technologies were supported (Lauber and Schenner 2011; Mitchell et al. 
2006). In EU climate and energy policy, technology differentiation is preferred by industries 
such as renewable energy and energy efficiency equipment producers, as well as environmental 
groups, while technology-neutral climate policies that emphasise emissions pricing through the 
EU-ETS are preferred by electricity producers and other businesses (Boasson and Wettestad 
2013). 
3.3 Interactive processes: interest group cooperation, coalition building and conflict  
The energy intensive industries supported by an umbrella organisation, BusinessEurope, 
initially attempted to resist EU-ETS reform and, once it became inevitable, they sought 
concessions (Jevnaker and Wettestad 2017).  
However, other business actors supported reform.  Established in 2011, an informal, ad-hoc 
and fluid grouping of more than 40 organisations, the ‘Friends of ETS’ (FoETS) coalition 
brought together multiple actors (Interview 1, 2015; Interview 21, 2015). Electricity producers, 
the wind industry, a furniture brand, think-tanks, gas companies, manufacturers of energy 
efficiency equipment, and energy generation plant were all represented alongside industry 
groups Eurelectic and Eurogas. Although not visible on the group’s formal publications, the 
coalition was created and directed by Change Partnership, a Brussels based climate NGO, with 
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) whose political judgment and policy knowledge was highly 
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regarded (Interview 8, 2015; Interview 15, 2015; Interview 21, 2015; Interview 26, 2015; 
Interview 31, 2016). With modest resources, the coalition was financially supported by the 
European Climate Foundation (ECF) among other donors (Interview 30, 2016; Change 
Partnership 2014). 
At the time of FoETS’ creation, there was substantial resistance to efforts being made by NGOs 
aimed at enlarging the ambition of EU climate policy through increasing headline GHG 
emissions reduction from 20% to 30% (Interview 2, 2015). Despite enthusiastic rhetoric about 
climate action, influential companies such as Shell were hesitant to commit to the increase, 
possibly because they were unable to accurately assess the commercial implications (Interview 
30, 2016). Meanwhile, Poland (repeatedly) vetoed the Commission’s proposals in the 
‘Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ (Keating, 2012). Given 
the seemingly insurmountable challenge of increasing the headline GHG emissions reduction 
target, a key action of the nascent FoETS was consequently to reassess the options for 
increasing the stringency of EU climate policy, concluding that actions intended to strengthen 
the EU-ETS would be palatable to most businesses (Interview 21, 2015; Interview 30, 2016).  
Although the economic crisis and Europe’s tarnished climate leader role following the 2009 
UN climate conference in Copenhagen meant that little appetite existed within either the 
Commission or the European Council to begin major reform of the EU-ETS (Interview 30, 
2016; Wettestad and Jevnaker, 2016), the ‘Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon 
economy in 2050’ did acknowledge that implementing energy efficiency targets may mean 
that:  
“…appropriate measures need to be considered, including recalibrating the ETS by 
setting aside a corresponding number of allowances…” (European Commission, 2011. 
p11 – authors’ emphasis).  
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Observing that one of the main EU energy and climate policy tasks was the drafting of an 
Energy Efficiency Directive to allow implementation of the target set in 2007, FoETS mustered 
support for the ‘set-aside’ principle from across the business community, including utilities 
such as ENEL, and oil and gas company Shell by promoting a causal narrative about the 
interaction between energy efficiency measures and the EU-ETS in which greater energy 
efficiency threatened the functioning of emissions trading by compounding the oversupply of 
allowances. Effectively, FoETS reframed the debate about the Energy Efficiency Directive to 
focus on the impact of such efficiency measures on the EU-ETS, much to the frustration of 
advocates for energy efficiency who saw the dominance of the EU-ETS in debates about 
climate and energy policy as detrimental to the goal of increased energy efficiency: 
“[The] ETS [is] a kind of a dogma and this we, as an efficiency community, have always 
been very wary of because it’s a sacred cow; you can’t touch the ETS, despite the fact 
that it has completely failed”…”there is a lot of emotional effort and personal 
reputation buried in the Emissions Trading Scheme, which, from our perspective, has 
been a complete failure because it hasn’t provoked any swing towards more efficiency 
measures across Europe.”…”I suppose we all have that tendency to hold onto our 
babies and to cherish them and not be able to open our eyes and see objectively where 
they’re really have their effect or not. But this one seems blatantly obvious to me it’s a 
failure but that’s my view.” (Interview 12, 2015)  
Similarly, other environmental organisations had misgivings about the strategic choice to 
pursue EU-ETS reform, believing that:  
“…they were focusing either exclusively or in an unbalanced way on ETS reform to the 
detriment of other areas” (Interview 33, 2016). 
Accepted to Journal of European Public Policy, 01/01/2019 
16 
 
Despite being aware of how unpopular the strategy would be with peers in the environmental 
community, the FoETS and its network collectively lobbied the Commission, to reflect this 
concern in the Energy Efficiency Directive, achieving some success:  
“In the implementation of the 20 % energy efficiency target, the Commission will have 
to monitor the impact of new measures on Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the 
Union’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) in order to maintain the incentives in the 
emissions trading system…” (European Commission, 2012b. Para. 55). 
The recognition in the Energy Efficiency Directive that the EU-ETS may require attention gave 
the campaign substantial momentum, since having acknowledged the potential connection, the 
Commission had little choice but to engage with ideas for EU-ETS reform, including 
‘backloading’, a practical means of creating the set-aside with legal precedent established 
through the front-loading provisions (Interview 21, 2015).  
The collaboration enabled coordination between renewable energy, oil and gas and electricity 
producers. In a letter sent by them in June 2012 to Commissioners they expressed their support 
for backloading ahead of the Commission’s proposals and the collective reaction to the 
proposals in July (3M et al. 2012; Euractiv 2012). Although the initial rejection by the 
European Parliament was a setback, the group continued to be closely coordinated, in both 
message and tactics, as the various businesses sought to persuade Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) and member states throughout the legislative process. By establishing trust 
among a small group of businesses through close social interaction, the coalition presented a 
strong ‘green-growth’ or ‘environmental capitalism’ narrative about the crucial role of the EU-
ETS and the urgent need to reform it (Interview 1, 2015; Interview 10, 2015).  
Having first persuaded the powerful electricity utility ENEL to adopt its position in favour of 
backloading, which gave credibility and the ‘perception of momentum’, the FoETS coalition’s 
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messaging strategy was to emphasise the ‘special’ status of the EU-ETS as the EU’s climate 
policy flagship to increase the salience of the instrument’s perceived failure, and its 
implications for climate action, to secure the most ambitious reform possible. In addition to the 
sunk political costs associated with its establishment, support for maintaining the instrument’s 
status was especially strong in DG Clima, responsible for drafting the reform legislation 
(Interview 2, 2015; Interview 33, 2016). Consequently, differences between DG Energy and 
DG Clima on the EU-ETS were deliberately cast as a direct confrontation between the heavy 
industry-oriented Energy Commissioner and DG Clima (Interview 30, 2016). Significant to the 
group’s strategy was emphasising the perceived failure of the ETS, framing it as the most 
pressing problem facing EU climate and energy policy, and making securing reform the 
overriding priority (Interview 30, 2016).  
That such a range of businesses was able to align with it shows the power of this essentially 
technology-neutral narrative about the need for EU-ETS reform. Electricity utilities seeking to 
maintain market share in the face of competition from renewables, gas companies seeking to 
improve their competiveness against (even) dirtier oil and coal producers, and consumer goods 
firms advocating for the most ‘efficient’ policy all invoked the idea.  
However, in 2013, the climate and energy policy community in Brussels simultaneously had 
two major policy developments in play. Alongside the EU-ETS reform legislation, advocacy 
groups were seeking to influence the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, a package of 
targets designed to maintain the EU’s trajectory towards deep decarbonisation by 2050. As 
well as opening up political space for bargaining between members states (Jevnaker and 
Wettestad 2017), it also complicated building a lobbying coalition to support EU-ETS reform. 
The strategy of creating a sense of crisis in the trading system clashed with the goals of actors, 
such as the renewable energy industry, who consistently argued that the EU-ETS was not the 
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‘be-all-and-end-all’ of EU climate and energy policy and that a broader basket of policies was 
more appropriate:  
“[They] wanted to keep on putting in language saying multiple targets. We kept on 
saying it’s only the ETS that counts.”…” [So] this was the sacrifice we had to make. It 
was either to get [renewables actors], or we can go and get more people who [have] 
more power, and I’d rather talk to the guys who’ve got more [power].” (Interview 30, 
2016) 
Nevertheless, the coalition and the coordination between electricity producers, NGOs and other 
businesses appears successful and is credited with influencing both the short-term goal of 
backloading and the longer-term MSR fix for the ETS (Interview 8, 2015; Interview 30, 2016; 
Interview 31, 2016; Wettestad and Jevnaker 2016). The FoETS, by recruiting key businesses 
and NGOs, was a lobbying ‘dream team’. The legitimacy of energy utilities with millions of 
customers and hundreds of thousands of employees, the campaigning nous of seasoned 
environmentalists, combined with a shared contacts book, all coordinated by a doggedly 
determined entrepreneur, appears formidable and decisive.  
4 Discussion and conclusions: the role and limits of climate policy entrepreneurship  
A direct correlation between the ‘strange-bedfellow’ coalition reported above and policy 
change is unlikely to be unequivocally demonstrable. However, the concerted efforts of 
business and other interest groups between 2012 and 2015, under the banner of Friends of ETS 
corroborates existing accounts of the EU-ETS reform process (Jevnaker and Wettestad 2017). 
Based on the preceding account, it is clear that as a result of the ‘Friends of ETS’ coalition, the 
electricity industry was more assertive, more organised and ‘had more friends’ than it would 
otherwise. Following the setback of the 2009 UN climate conference in Copenhagen, the 
coordinator tenaciously pursued new opportunities to shape EU climate policy. The coalition 
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demonstrated keen social acuity in identifying a policy position to which policy actors with 
divergent interests could subscribe. This broad appeal, combined with the fostering of a highly 
sociable atmosphere around the coalition, allowed recruitment of credible businesses actors 
that could speak on behalf of the group. Although a small NGO with limited resources, through 
the creation of Friends of ETS, it was able to ‘punch above its weight’; a hallmark of policy 
entrepreneurship (Boasson and Huitema 2017).  
From a discursive institutionalist perspective, the coalition deployed background ideational 
abilities to navigate and exploit the extant institutional environment. By emphasising the 
difficulties faced by the EU-ETS, the coalition created and promoted a powerful story about 
EU-ETS reform as not only one of several climate strategies, but, in the contemporary 
institutional context the only viable strategy. The adoption of a position relative to technology 
neutrality reflects an appreciation of the ideational divide between DG Energy and DG Clima, 
the fundamentally immutable nature of the EU-ETS, and differing commercial interests. 
Foreground ideational abilities, meanwhile, were deployed to create a mobilising narrative that 
set FoETS as a challenger to the perceived heavy industry champion Energy Commissioner. 
The normative idea of the ‘rightness’ of climate action was used to frame group membership 
in opposition to the heavy-industrial ‘bad guys’, represented by energy commissioner 
Oettinger, with whom few self-identified progressive policy specialists would choose to be 
associated.  
In addition to this ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ approach to galvanising support for action, 
technology neutrality, a cognitive idea about what constitutes effective policy, was used to 
broaden the appeal of the coalition, allowing the participation of businesses previously wary of 
supporting a conventional environmentalist position. In particular, electricity and gas 
businesses were able to square the technology neutral narrative with their commercial interests. 
At the same time, groups such as renewable energy and energy efficiency companies that had 
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traditionally resisted a technology neutral policy narrative and were already in a weak political 
position due to the ongoing economic crisis, were further marginalised. 
The discursive entrepreneurial activity that we have revealed and analysed was likely to have 
played a key role in securing EU-ETS reforms, backloading and the market stability reserve. 
However, in doing so, it also marginalised more plural policy narratives about the 2030 targets, 
rooted in understandings of systemic change that emphasised the value of strategic technology 
support and further entrenched a ‘green capitalism’ approach to climate policy (Fitch-Roy et 
al. 2018). While the implications for future EU climate and energy policy are unclear, the 
ability of discursive entrepreneurship by interest groups to affect substantial change will 
continue to be academically relevant. 
At this point, it is important to reflect on the types of ideas in play by returning to Schmidt’s 
typology of levels of ideational generality (Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2017). The coalition had a 
discernible impact at the detailed ‘policy level’ and it operationalised ideas that exist at the 
‘programmatic level’ by diagnosing the problems of the EU-ETS as the climate policy problem 
to be solved it also created new norms of collaborative working between NGOs and businesses 
in pursuit of change. We can say that this ‘strange bedfellow’ coalition was able to create and 
maintain an ideational shift within the policy community through discursive means.  
However, it is surprising that an environmental actor should so enthusiastically pursue a 
strategy that not only avoids challenging the inherent contradictions of the idea of climate-
friendly market-capitalism (which we need not rehearse here), but goes further in 
wholeheartedly embracing the idea that markets alone can fix the climate problem, albeit for 
pragmatic, strategic reasons. This is especially pertinent given firstly the demonstrably 
lacklustre performance of the EU-ETS in driving change to-date and secondly, the radical roots 
of environmental activism that informs the identity of many environmental activists (Kashima 
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et al. 2014). Business entrepreneurs and other élites adopting green credentials, whether for 
principled reasons or ‘green impression management’ purposes are quite familiar (Nye and 
Owens 2008; Prudham 2009). It is somewhat unsettling, however, to observe movement in the 
opposite direction. 
Finally, if politics is about “who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell 1936), the question of 
power comes to the fore. It is quite possible to interpret the case outlined above as one of 
shrewd compromise. By accepting the world (and its institutions) ‘as it is’, the coalition’s 
founders brought about pro-environmental change by using the power of incumbent interests 
against them, skilfully manipulating ideas through discourse. However, this immediately begs 
the question ‘at what cost?’ By adopting and amplifying a narrative about environmental 
policy-change acceptable to a wide range of businesses, other accounts of how policy can be 
used to tackle climate change were marginalised. This observation opens up the possibility of 
an alternative interpretation, in which business successfully co-opted and instrumentalised the 
environmental movement in pursuit of a ‘change-but-no-change’ outcome. 
So, in conclusion, while the 2012-2015 EU-ETS reform episode has been meticulously 
analysed, the role of interest group coordination has been somewhat overlooked (Jevnaker and 
Wettestad 2017). We have addressed that gap. Our research shows that the speed with which 
reform of EU-ETS was agreed and implemented in 2012-2014 was partially dependent on 
cooperation among pro-ETS businesses. Policy entrepreneurship through discursive framing 
of EU-ETS reform as ‘the only (climate) game in town’ enabled cooperation between NGOs, 
business and key parts of the bureaucracy to argue for change. Whether or not this was an astute 
strategic choice by the environmentalist at the helm of the coalition or a win for businesses less 
keen on radical or ambitious climate policy, is not immediately obvious.  
Accepted to Journal of European Public Policy, 01/01/2019 
22 
 
The DI framework illuminates the significance of the strategic discursive action that 
differentiates between an actor’s ability to read the terrain (i.e. background ideational abilities), 
and their ability to critically engage with that terrain, or redraw the map (i.e. foreground 
discursive abilities). The policy entrepreneurship explored here hinges on the relative 
importance of these two abilities and prompts further research into how heterogeneous 
collaborations achieve policy change. The challenges of defining and identifying policy 
entrepreneurship and its agents in terms of personal characteristics are well known (Boasson 
and Huitema 2017). However, in cases such as the one depicted here, even though many 
reasonable definitions of policy entrepreneurship would identify the activity as entrepreneurial, 
merely having the ‘right characteristics’, successfully using the strategies and playing the role 
of entrepreneur may lead to fundamentally ambiguous outcomes. Consequently, further 
research is required in order to more clearly understand the constraints on entrepreneurial 
success and the role of policy entrepreneurship as a discursive activity. 
Notes 
1. Respondents were asked to provide their perceptions of the policy context and 
background, an account of the reform processes in question, their tactics for engaging 
with the policy process, including membership of lobbying coalitions, and the observed 
tactical strategies of others. Interview transcripts were then coded for ideas, group 
membership, types of actor and engagement strategy. In counteracting ‘expansiveness 
bias’ commonly encountered with potential policy entrepreneurs (Beyers et al. 2014), 
reports of success were cross checked against other accounts of the same phenomena. 
The methods used in collecting and analysing the data were evaluated against criteria 
of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 
1985; Shenton 2004). 
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2. Backloading mirrors the existing ‘frontloading’ provisions that enabled industries 
(primarily electricity producers) to procure allowances ahead of compliance periods. 
3. Decision No 1359/2013/EU 
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